The purpose of this study was to determine individuals' willingness to enroll in voluntary payments for carbon sequestration programs through the use of a discrete choice experiment delivered to forest owners living in the rapidly urbanizing region surrounding Charlotte, North Carolina. We examined forest owners' willingness to enroll in payments for carbon sequestration policies under different levels of financial incentives (annual revenue), different contract lengths and different program administrators (e.g., private companies versus a state or federal agency). We also examined the influence forest owners' sense of place had on their willingness to enroll in hypothetical programs. Our results showed a high level of ambivalence towards participating in payments for carbon sequestration programs. However, both financial incentives and contract lengths significantly influenced forest owners' intent to enroll. Neither program administration nor forest owners' sense of place influenced intent to enroll. While our analyses indicated payments from carbon sequestration programs are not currently competitive with the monetary returns expected from timber harvest or property sales, certain forest owners might see payments for carbon sequestration programs as a viable option for offsetting increasing tax costs as development encroaches and property values rise.
Introduction 4
Across the United States, forest and agricultural landscapes are becoming increasingly 5 fragmented as urban populations grow and cities expand (Theobald 2005; Theobald 2001; 6 Theobald and Romme 2007) . The fragmentation of urban-proximate forest and agricultural 7 landscapes can have both immediate and long-term effects on natural systems. Immediate 8 impacts include the displacement of wildlife as habitat degrades as well as reductions in water 9 quality as erosion increases due to the direct removal of above-ground biomass (Hansen et al. 10 2005; Paul and Meyer 2001) . The long-term environmental impacts of urban-proximate 11 landscape fragmentation are more difficult to observe. The loss of endemic plant and animal 12 species as well as biological diversity more generally, may only be realized after urbanization is 13 well underway (Theobald, Miller, and Hobbs 1997) . Similarly, alterations to natural or semi-14 natural hydrologic systems (primarily as a result of increased water use) may impact the ability 15 of ecological systems to respond to drought and climate-related stressors (Allan 2004) . In 16 response to these direct impacts and long-term feedbacks, urban planners, forest managers and 17 agricultural associations are actively seeking out and exploring viable policies and programs that 18 conserve forest and agricultural landscapes and maintain the ecosystem services they provide 19 (Gobster, Stewart, and Bengston 2004) . 20
Payments for ecosystem services policies are one of many potential policy options to 21 slow the rate of land use conversion in urbanizing areas (Bengston, Fletcher, and Nelson 2004; 22 Salzman 2005) . Payments for ecosystem services can provide non-industrial private forest 23 owners a financial incentive to conserve or manage their land for the production of a valued 24 PAYMENTS FOR C SEQUESTRATION TO ALLEVIATE DEVELOPMENT PRESSURE 2 ecosystem service like sequestering carbon from the atmosphere, maintaining water quality or 25 conserving wildlife habitat (Jack, Kousky, and Sims 2008; Engel, Pagiola, and Wunder 2008) . 26
Simply put, payments for ecosystem services programs are policy instruments which require 27 individuals (typically landowners) to engage in a specific land management practice that: 1) 28 comes at a personal cost (which can include opportunity costs); and 2) results in the continued or 29 enhanced production of an ecological service that benefits society (Shelley 2011) . As a note, we 30 use the terminology 'payments for ecosystem services' given it connotes the Millennium 31 Ecosystem Assessment's simple definition of 'ecosystem services' as "the benefits people obtain 32 from ecosystems" (2003, 3) . Interested readers are referred to Shelley (2011) and Derissen and 33 Latacz-Lohmann (2013) for substantive reviews of the terminology used to describe these types 34 of policy instruments. 35
Payments for carbon sequestration policies are particularly attractive mechanisms 36 because they often do not require intensive investments of either time or money from the forest 37 owner, allowing the forest owner to benefit financially from non-intensive management 38 strategies (Bigsby 2009; Lippke and Perez-Garcia 2008) . Payments for carbon sequestration 39 policies may be especially appealing in the United States where most non-industrial private 40 forest owners do not actively manage their property through a forest management plan. Just 4% 41 of non-industrial private forest owners in the United States have a written management plan and 42 only 14% have ever sought out professional advice about their woodlands (Butler 2008 ). Other 43 potential policy solutions such as cost-share programs have not been widely adopted, presumably 44 because they are designed to supplement the forest products industry and often stipulate forest 45 owners actively manage their woodlands for timber extraction (Kilgore et al. 2007) ; only 6% of 46 hypothetical carbon sequestration programs. The program attributes examined included: contract 115 length (5, 10 or 15 years), financial incentives ($5, $15 or $30 per acre annual revenue), the 116 requirement for a forest management plan to be in place and the stipulation of a penalty for early 117 withdrawal from the program. The results indicated per acre annual revenue was a positive 118 predictor of program enrollment, while contract length, the requirement to have a forest 119 management plan in place and the stipulation of a penalty for early withdrawal were all 120 negatively related to forest owners' intent to enroll. In another study investigating the intentions 121 of Massachusetts forest owners to participate in payments for carbon sequestration programs, 122 Markowski-Lindsay et al. (2011) found shorter contracts (15 years), higher payments ($1000 per 123 acre per year), the ability to withdraw from the program without penalty and not being required 124
to have a forest management plan in place were positive predictors of program enrollment. The 125 authors note that financial incentives (annual revenue per acre) were very inelastic (i.e., the 126 intent to enroll did not change much as the incentive price increased or decreased, Png 2012) . 127
The inelasticity of financial incentives suggests forest owners' participation is likely dependent 128 upon other factors. Markowski-Lindsay et al.'s (2011) study determined the overall probability 129 of enrollment in payments for carbon sequestration programs for Massachusetts forest owners 130 was less than 38%, even when desirable attributes were maximized and undesirable attributes 131 were minimized. 132
Other studies have examined the influence of program attributes associated with 133 payments for other ecosystem services, aside from carbon sequestration (Rabotyagov and Lin 134 2013; Knoot, Rickenbach, and Silbernagel 2015; Kelly, Germain, and Stehman 2015) . Knoot et 135 al. (2015) investigated the effect of four cumulative requirement levels (i.e., no requirements, 136 management plan, practices and inspection) and their impact on Wisconsin forest owners' 137 PAYMENTS FOR C SEQUESTRATION TO ALLEVIATE DEVELOPMENT PRESSURE 7 willingness to participate in programs that offered payments for the provisioning of three 138 ecosystem services: bird habitat, carbon sequestration and water quality. Their results revealed 139 requirements involving more commitment deterred participation; participation rates dropped 140 from 42% when no requirements were stipulated to 18% when all of the aforementioned land 141 management practices were required. Knoot et al. (2015) also found that program administration 142 (government or market) held no significant influence on participation across all requirement 143 levels. This is inconsistent with findings from stakeholder focus groups in the Charlotte 144 metropolitan region, which indicated strong anti-government sentiment that could affect forest 145 owners' receptivity to government administered programs in our study area (BenDor et al. 2014) . 146
Similarly, Kelly et al. (2015) assessed the likelihood of New York forest owners to enroll in 147 various payments for forest conservation programs. The payments for conservation programs 148 received an average enrollment of 8% regardless of time commitment. However, financial 149 incentives (annual payment levels) and management plan requirements were significant 150 attributes affecting enrollment. In another similar study, Rabotyagov and Lin (2013) 
Psychological and Sociodemographic Factors Influencing Program Enrollment 158
Aside from the attributes associated with payments for carbon sequestration programs, 159 forest owners' psychological attachments to their property might affect their intent to enroll 160 PAYMENTS FOR C SEQUESTRATION TO ALLEVIATE DEVELOPMENT PRESSURE 8 (Markowski-Lindsay et al. 2011) . However, no previous study has explicitly and empirically 161 examined this relationship. 'Sense of place' is a positive bond between individuals and their 162 environment, based on affect, cognition and symbolic meanings (Stedman 2002) . Several studies 163 suggest the sense of place that an individual forest owner has towards their property will affect 164 how they manage that property (Lai and Kreuter 2012; Lokocz, Ryan, and Sadler 2011) . 165 Lai and Kreuter (2012) examined how 'place attachment' (a construct very similar to 166 sense of place) influenced Texas landowners' intent to retain their land and engage in 167 conservation behaviors. Much like the forest owners near Charlotte in our study, the landowners 168 examined in Lai and Kreuter's study were facing development pressure from the nearby cities of 169
Austin and San Antonio. Landowners living in the Hill Country region adjacent to the 170 metropolitan areas surrounding both of these cities indicated a strong intent to keep their 171 property in the family. Land owners' attachments to their personal properties, as well as their 172 perceptions of environmental change throughout the region, were significantly and positively 173 related to the intent to retain their properties. In addition, landowners who indicated they were 174 either heavily dependent upon, or attached a lot of social meanings to, their properties were 175 willing to invest more in conservation-oriented land management strategies. 176
Relatedly, Lokocz et al. (2011) utilized photo-elicitation methods to examine how rural 177
Massachusetts residents' psychological attachments to local landscape features influenced their 178 attitudes toward conservation and land use planning. Participants in the study indicated a high 179 level of attachment towards natural areas (consisting of forests, streams, ponds and meadows) 180 and the majority of participants showed strong support for protecting local woodlands and 181 natural resources. The study's qualitative methods illustrate how the strong, personally 182 PAYMENTS FOR C SEQUESTRATION TO ALLEVIATE DEVELOPMENT PRESSURE 9 meaningful connections an individual has towards local and familiar landscapes can shape 183 support for conservation-oriented land use planning efforts. 184
In addition to sense of place and place attachment, Thompson and Hansen (2013; 2012) 
Study Region 192
This study focused on the area surrounding Charlotte, North Carolina (USA) (Figure 1) . 193
Since the 1980s the city and its surrounding metropolitan region have experienced rapid 194 population growth characterized by disjunct, low-density development (Meentemeyer et al. 195 2013) . Urban development throughout the region has come at the expense of forest and 196 agricultural lands, and growth projections for the region suggest more than 210,000 ha of 197 forested and agricultural land will be converted to development by the year 2030 if observed 198 trends between 1996 and 2006 continue (Meentemeyer et al. 2013) . The majority of forested land 199 throughout the region is owned by non-industrial private forest owners, and these holdings tend 200 to be relatively small (< 10 ha), which limits forest owners' ability to financially benefit from 201 either harvesting timber or biomass (Dorning, Smith, et al. 2015) . Past research in the region 202 suggests forest owners are concerned with rising property taxes and the lack of tax-relief policies 203 focused on conserving forested lands; this concern is compounded by strong emotional and 204 psychological ties to the region's culturally rich landscapes (BenDor et al. 2014 hectares) and have a forest management plan in place that allows timber harvesting. These 212 requirements limit the ability of the present-use value program to be an indirect tool capable of 213 slowing urban growth. Given this, other more direct land use policies need to be explored. It is 214 possible a regional carbon sequestration market could allow forest owners the ability to benefit 215 financially from conserving or managing their woodlands while maintaining their strong 216 emotional and psychological connections to their properties. 217
Discrete Choice Experimental Design 218
We developed a discrete choice experiment to explore contingent forest owner behaviors 219 in response to hypothetical payments for carbon sequestration programs. Stated choice methods 220 are commonly used to understand individuals' behavioral responses to hypothetical choices 221 (Louviere, Hensher, and Swait 2000) . Our goal was to understand which factors exhibit the most 222 influence on forest owners' behavioral intentions, including the attributes of the payment 223 program as well as individual psychological and sociodemographic factors. Our analysis was 224 guided by a desire to better understand if, and how, the attributes of the payment program alterd 225 forest owners' preferences for those programs. Our intent was not to estimate a willingness to 226 accept value for all of the non-financial attributes of payments programs, rather we were 227 primarily interested in taking advantage of the methodological benefits of discrete choice 228 PAYMENTS FOR C SEQUESTRATION TO ALLEVIATE DEVELOPMENT PRESSURE 11 experiments (i.e., requiring respondents to cognitively evaluates specific trade-offs among 229 program attributes (Hanley, Mourato, and Wright 2001) 
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Scenario Development, Attributes and Levels. To elicit the most valid responses, the 251 survey instrument included a narrative frame describing the general characteristics of payments 252 for carbon sequestration programs and how they could be implemented in the study region. 253
Following the narrative framing statement, forest owners were asked to evaluate a set of nine 254 possible payments for carbon sequestration programs and, for each program, to carefully 255 consider its attributes and indicate whether or not they would participate in the program. 256
Respondents were also given an opt out response option to avoid the likelihood of a forest owner 257 providing a response if they felt uninformed or unqualified to make a decision (Banzhaf, 258 Johnson, and Mathews 2001; Kontoleon and Yabe 2003) . The choice set was comprised of 259 various combinations of the three key attributes: financial incentives, contract lengths and 260 program administration. Each of these three attributes were varied across three levels; the levels 261 were set to encompass realistic ranges based upon previous research and consultation with 262 experts in the region's potential for a carbon sequestration market. The full narrative frame and 263 choice set are shown in Figure 2 ; individual attributes and their specified levels are noted in 264 Table 1 . The narrative was developed such that it clearly described the essential components of a 265 payments for ecosystem services program, as outlined by Engel et al. (2008) . These essential 266 components are: 1) an explicit description of the type of land being conserved and the ecosystem 267 service it provides; 2) the ability of enrollees in the program to terminate the contractual 268 relationship; and 3) the establishment of a monitoring system (in our case a written forest 269 management plan that required conservation) in order to ensure payments are the result of 270 additional land management activities. Given payments for ecosystem services programs often 271 fail to demonstrate additionality, producing more of a given ecosystem service than would have 272 been produced without the program, we attempted to make it as clear and as explicit as possible 273 PAYMENTS FOR C SEQUESTRATION TO ALLEVIATE DEVELOPMENT PRESSURE 13 that the payments would not be "money for nothing" (Engel, Pagiola, and Wunder 2008; Ferraro 274 and Pattanayak 2006) . 275
With three attributes, each presented at one of three levels in any given program, there 276 were a total of 27 possible combinations to represent different carbon sequestration programs. 277
Given it was deemed too burdensome to have each forest owner consider and respond to all 27 278 combinations, we opted for a fractional factorial design comprised of nine combinations (i.e., 279 hypothetical payments for carbon sequestration programs). All sampled forest owners received 280 the same choice set of nine possible carbon sequestration programs. 281
Variables Used in Econometric Model 282
A summary of all variables used in the econometric modeling is provided in Table 2 . 283
Respondents' sociodemographic characteristics were captured through the first mail-back survey. 284
Specifically, we collected data on forest owners' age, gender, education and income. We also 285 collected data on the amount of time the forest owner has spent on the property (presence); this 286 was calculated as the total years of ownership multiplied by the number of days they spend on 287 the property per year. The first mail-back survey also ascertained whether or not respondents had 288 a forest management plan in place (management plan present) and whether they currently 289 harvested timber for income on their property (harvest for income). 290
The first mail-back survey was also used to measure forest owners' psychological 291 connections to forested areas on their properties. We used Jorgensen and Stedman's (2006) Carmines and McIver 1981) . With these 298 criteria satisfied, a single sense of place factor score was calculated for inclusion in the mixed 299 effects logistic regression model described below. This method is identical to that used in 300 previous analyses of these data (Dorning, Smith, et al., 2015) . 301
Other variables included in the model were derived from either the analysis of satellite 302 imagery/LiDAR data or publically available property tax records. Specific measures included the 303 size of the forest stand on the respondent's property estimated via satellite imagery (forest size) 304 and the appraised value of the parcel extracted from 2011 tax records (economic value). Very 305 few stated choice experiments have used biophysical variables derived via remote sensing as 306 factors influencing forest owners' decisions; exceptions include the work of Naidoo and 307
Adamowicz (2005) and Dorning and her colleagues (2015) . 308
Econometric Model Specification 309
We used a mixed effects logistic regression specification to estimate the probability that 310 forest owners would participate in payments for carbon sequestration programs depending upon 311 the level of attributes presented. The mixed effects logistic regression is a flexible specification 312 that can approximate any random utility model (McFadden and Train 2000) . The mixed effects 313 logistic regression specification decomposes random error into two components; the first 314 component is correlated over alternatives and heteroskedastic while the second part is assumed 315 to be independently and identically distributed over alternatives and individuals (McFadden 316 1984) . This is noteworthy because individuals' responses within the choice set are likely to be 317 highly correlated. Preferences and subsequently utility functions will vary between individuals; 318 the mixed effects specification accommodates this and is commonly used to overcome the 319 The model posits the probability of enrolling in payments for carbon sequestration programs is a 328 function of the program's attributes, an individual's sociodemographic characteristics and the 329 characteristics of their property. Estimation was completed using dummy variable coding for 330 attribute levels and the meqrlogit command in Stata 14.0 (StataCorp 2015) . 331
Data Collection 332
Data on forest owners and their contingent enrollment in hypothetical payments for 333 carbon sequestration programs were collected via two self-administered mail-back surveys. We 334 sent surveys to a sample of forest owners in a five-county region on the eastern side of Charlotte, 335 an extent characterizing the region's full development gradient. We drew a sample of 2,500 336 landowners from a sampling frame comprised of private forest owners within the five-county 337 study area; forest owner names and addresses were obtained from publically available tax 338 records. The sample consisted of forest owners who owned more than 2 ha of contiguous forest 339 (determined via analysis of both 2011 Landsat and LiDAR data (Singh et al. 2012) ). The initial 340 sample of forest owners were asked to agree to an on-site ecological assessment and timber 341 cruise of their property and, subsequently, to complete two mail-back surveys; a total of 143 342 PAYMENTS FOR C SEQUESTRATION TO ALLEVIATE DEVELOPMENT PRESSURE 16 Both survey packets mailed to respondents included a personalized map with an aerial 357 photo of forested land on the respondents' property. In a cover letter, we asked forest owners to 358 respond to the questions in reference to the forested land shown on the map, excluding from 359 consideration other forested areas they might have owned. These explicit instructions were 360 included to make responses and contingent decisions personally meaningful. 361
Results

362
The characteristics of our sample of forest owners and their properties are reported in 363 Table 2 . The majority of respondents (71.7%) were men and the mean age was 64.2 (SD = 11.2). 364
All respondents had graduated from high school, with the majority (68.3%) also having a 365 PAYMENTS FOR C SEQUESTRATION TO ALLEVIATE DEVELOPMENT PRESSURE 17 bachelor's degree. Respondents' properties ranged in size from one to fifty-one hectares, with an 366 average size of 6.9 hectares (SD = 8.4). On average, respondents indicated owning their 367 forestland for at least twenty years (M = 20.4, SD = 12.8); this varied widely however, with 368 length of ownership ranging from two to fifty-eight years. The majority of respondents (68.3%) 369 lived on or within a half-mile of the forested property. 370
The average size of respondents' forests was 6.9 hectares (SD = 8.4) and the assessed tax 371 value of their entire property was just under $400 thousand USD. However, both the size of 372 respondents' forest stands and the value of their properties varied widely (Table 2) , mitigating 373 some of the concern over coverage error given the relatively small sample. Only a relatively 374 small proportion (18.3%) of our sample reported harvesting timber to generate income and just 375 under one-third (31.7%) reported having a management plan in place. 376
When queried about the sense of place respondents had towards their forested property, 377 respondents on average reported strong personal meanings (Table 3) for the choice opportunities in which a forest owner indicated an intent to enroll, we applied an 433 annual discount rate of 4% across the hypothetical contracts' lengths to account for the time 434 PAYMENTS FOR C SEQUESTRATION TO ALLEVIATE DEVELOPMENT PRESSURE 20 value of cash according to Folmer et al. (1995) . This allowed us to arrive at a total discounted 435 contract length revenue value. Our calculation was based on the assumption annual revenue 436 would be received beginning in the second year of enrollment. The variation in intent to enroll 437 prices was even more evident when viewed over the life of the contract; average discounted 438 contract length revenue ranged from $190 per acre for the $5 per acre policies to $8,540 for the 439 $50 per acre policies. 440
We estimated the years of enrollment that would be required for respondents to receive 441 equal returns from a payments for carbon sequestration program relative to returns they would 442 receive from either cutting all of their forest for timber or selling it at its current (2014) market 443 value; the results are shown in Table 5 . If a payments for carbon sequestration program were 444 available that yielded the maximum $50 per acre annual return over a 15-year contract length, 445 forest owners would not be able to generate an equivalent amount of revenue from the program, 446 even if they enrolled for two consecutive contracts (years of enrollment to match timber value = 447 38.4). This result suggests that even under the highest-return option and a relatively long 448 contract-length program, a payments for carbon sequestration program would not be an attractive 449 alternative to either selling property for development or harvesting for timber. As can be seen in 450 column 6 of Table 5 the years of enrollment required to equal their properties' current market 451 value is well beyond any planning time frame (i.e., 600 to > 13,000 years). Obviously there are a 452 variety of factors that affect forest owners' decisions to sell their property for development or 453 harvest it for timber production; the purpose here is to compare the options purely on their 454 financial returns. 455
Discussion 456
Policy Implications 457 PAYMENTS FOR C SEQUESTRATION TO ALLEVIATE DEVELOPMENT PRESSURE 21
As exurban development spreads across landscapes, large contiguous tracts of forest have 458 become increasingly fragmented, threatening the ecosystem services they provide (Theobald 459 2005; Theobald 2001; Theobald and Romme 2007) . Payments for ecosystem service programs, 460 and payments for carbon sequestration in particular, provide a mechanism through which 461 regional planners and policy makers can conserve urban-proximate forestlands and the 462 ecosystem services they provide by allowing private forest owners to benefit financially from not 463 selling their land for development or harvesting for timber production (Bigsby 2009 ). Alternative 464 policy mechanisms, such as the procurement and conservation of private forestland by a public 465
or not-for-profit organization, can also alleviate development pressure (Newburn et al. 2005) . 466
However, transferring land from the private to public domain is only likely to occur near highly 467 valued resources such as riparian areas, simply pushing development pressures to other areas 468 around a metropolitan region (Dorning, Koch, et al. 2015) . Additionally, the efficient transfer of 469 private land to the public-domain requires complex payment and/or transfer options capable of 470 meeting the needs of different types of private landowners (e.g., rural residents, farmers, forest 471 owners) (Nielsen-Pincus, Ribe, and Johnson 2015). Payments for carbon sequestration programs 472 offer a flexible policy alternative, allowing forest owners the ability to continue living on their 473 properties while simultaneously receiving an annual payment for the carbon being sequestered 474 and stored in their forest stands. 475
While payments for carbon sequestration programs are attractive policy mechanisms at a 476 conceptual level, their implementation has been severely limited by the lack of regional carbon 477 markets (Newell, Pizer, and Raimi 2013) only 45.8% of respondents indicated an intent to enroll; this proportion declined as annual 492 payments were reduced and contract lengths were extended. This result is consistent with 493 previous research (Fletcher, Kittredge, and Stevens 2009; Markowski-Lindsay et al. 2011; 494 Miller, Snyder, and Kilgore 2012; Miller et al. 2014 ) and perhaps expected given most private 495 forest owners in the United States are passive managers. We had expected a higher level of 496 interest in payments for carbon sequestration programs given a recent region-wide study found 497 non-industrial private forest owners to be generally receptive to payments for carbon 498 sequestration programs (Khanal et al. 2016 ). Khanal and his colleagues found 30% of a sample 499 of non-industrial forest owners from across the Southeastern US agreed with the statement 500 "carbon sequestration could generate additional revenue for me"; only 11% of the sample 501 disagreed with the statement. Similarly, 45% of the sample indicated they were "interested in 502 PAYMENTS FOR C SEQUESTRATION TO ALLEVIATE DEVELOPMENT PRESSURE 23 exploring carbon sequestration opportunities on [their] forestland"; only 12% were not 503 interested. 504 Our sample's low level of interest in enrolling in payments for carbon sequestration 505 programs is likely attributable to a variety of factors. First, they are likely to have a limited 506 knowledge of the 'ecosystem services' concept and, relatedly, are likely to know very little about 507 how carbon markets would actually work in practice (Metz and Weigel 2010) . Given this, it is 508 logical for forest owners to be hesitant about making, or even indicating their preferences for, 509 decisions related to the long-term use of their property. More focused research, particularly 510 research using multiple types of data (i.e., quantitative and qualitative), needs to be conducted to 511 determine if a lack of knowledge and familiarity are in fact major barriers to forest owners' 512 intent to enroll in emerging carbon markets. Second, through the use of a stated choice 513 experiment, our study required forest owners to carefully consider their forested property and 514 what the consequences of each hypothetical policy scenario would be for themselves and their 515
property. Previous research may have over-estimated forest owners' interest in carbon 516 sequestrations programs due to the fact simple statement items presented in mail-back 517 questionnaires are context-deficient and do not require forest owners to carefully consider the 518 details and consequences of their land-use decisions (Khanal et al. 2016) . 519
When our sample of forest owners did indicate an intent to enroll, their preferences were 520 influenced by the financial returns yielded by the program as well as its length. Respondents had 521 strong preferences for programs yielding higher returns, which is logical and consistent with all 522 previous empirical research (Fletcher, Kittredge, and Stevens 2009; Dickinson et al. 2012; 523 Markowski-Lindsay et al. 2011; Rabotyagov and Lin 2013; Knoot, Rickenbach, and Silbernagel 524 2015; Kelly, Germain, and Stehman 2015; Miller, Snyder, and Kilgore 2012; Miller et al. 2014) . 525
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The majority of previous research has also found non-industrial private forest owners tend to be 526 hesitant to make long-term decisions committing them to managing their forestlands in any one 527 particular way (Dickinson et al. 2012; Markowski-Lindsay et al. 2011; Newell, Pizer, and Raimi 528 2013; Miller, Snyder, and Kilgore 2012; Miller et al. 2014 ). This unfortunately does not bode 529 well for the prospect of establishing a regional payments for carbon sequestration market within 530 the study area. market in the Southeast would require a critical mass of tradable carbon, in this case, a large pool 538 stored in private forests under long-term management contracts. For regional markets to be 539 successful, industries that might see them as viable mechanisms to offset emissions would need 540 some long-term assurances in the market's stability. Absent that stability, alternative 541 mechanisms or alternative carbon markets (e.g. REDD+) are likely to be preferred. 542
We focused our survey on payments for carbon sequestration based on market prices for 543 similar markets in the U.S., though other carbon payment mechanisms do exist. Payments for 544 carbon storage, or avoided carbon release from deforestation, would likely provide much higher 545 payment rates than those for sequestration as forest owners would be compensated for the total 546 amount of carbon stored rather than incremental carbon sequestered. Additionally, estimates of 547 the social cost of carbon at $36 per metric ton (Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of 548
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Carbon 2013) far exceed the current value in most markets, bringing the potential payment level 549 up to $72 per acre per year for carbon sequestered in Southeastern forests if the true cost of 550 carbon were to be reflected in market prices (though Moore and Diaz (2015) argue the figure  551 should be much higher). Given the preference of forest owners for greater financial returns, 552 higher payment rates could increase the feasibility of carbon programs for alleviating 553 development pressure in urbanizing areas. 554
Despite the relative ambivalence of forest owners towards participating in payments for 555
carbon sequestration programs at current rates and their aversion to programs with longer 556 contract lengths, our results did identify some demographic groups that can be targeted as 'early 557 adopters' to pilot payments for carbon sequestration programs. Specifically, our results 558 suggested more educated individuals as well as individuals with smaller incomes were 559 significantly more likely to indicate intent to enroll relative to forest owners with fewer years of 560 formal education and wealthier individuals. These findings could be insightful for efficiently 561 targeting specific types of forest owners most likely to participate in a pilot payments for carbon 562 sequestration program, if one were initiated throughout the region. These findings can be used to 563 develop communication strategies targeted at specific forest owners that are most likely to enroll. 564
Given our findings suggest the populations most likely to enroll are those forest owners who are 565 more educated and who also have smaller annual incomes, the logical 'target population' would 566 be retirees looking to maintain the aesthetic appeal of their forested land while also having some 567 formal policy mechanism that would allow them to generate a cash-flow from their passive 568 ownership. 569
It is interesting to note forest owners' sense of place was not significantly related to their 570 intent to enroll in payments for carbon sequestration programs. This is especially noteworthy 571 PAYMENTS FOR C SEQUESTRATION TO ALLEVIATE DEVELOPMENT PRESSURE 26 given forest owners, on average, indicated strong personal meanings attached to their forested 572 property. Previous research into payments for ecosystem services programs suggests that when 573 the amount of the payment itself is marginal relative to landowners' other sources of income (as 574 is the case in our study area), the larger the influence of other benefits such as maintaining a 575 desired aesthetic or family/cultural values tied to the land (Muradian et al. 2010) . We can only 576 speculate as to why sense of place was not significantly related to forest owners' willingness to 577 enroll, as anticipated. One possible explanation is that simply having the word 'program' 578 attached may cause forest owners to wrongfully identify payments for carbon sequestration 579 programs with other more intensive programs, such as present use valuation programs. Simply 580 put, some forest owners may not associate payments for carbon sequestration programs with an 581 increased ability to maintain the non-market values they ascribe to their forested property, 582 marginalizing the true and expected relationship between the sense of place construct and 583 willingness to enroll. Payment may actually be viewed as undermining the intrinsic values the 584 forest owner wishes to protect (Muradian et al. 2013) . 585
Limitations 586
Estimating the utilities associated with the attributes of hypothetical policies and 587 programs via stated choice methods is a difficult task for economists and other social scientists 588 who focus on human decision making. This difficulty comes from a variety of different sources 589 ranging from deciding which attributes define the hypothetical policy or program to establishing 590 a realistic range of values across which those attributes will vary in the choice set. Attributes and 591 levels selected should be both understandable (DeShazo and Fermo 2002) and relevant (Hensher 592 2006) to respondents. In this study, we attempted to meet both of these criteria through a detailed 593 review of previous research on the feasibility and costs associated with payments for carbon 594 PAYMENTS FOR C SEQUESTRATION TO ALLEVIATE DEVELOPMENT PRESSURE 27 sequestration programs and consultation with several bioeconomists who were able to inform the 595 levels we chose to use for our annual payments per acre attribute. While we hope this 596 precautionary step increases the validity of our findings, there are undoubtedly a wide variety of 597 program characteristics (e.g., method of payment, compliance requirements, etc.) that also likely 598 to influence forest owners' willingness to enroll in payments for carbon sequestration programs. 599
We were only able to focus on a small set of attributes within this study, but hope future research 600 will build upon our findings and the findings of similar work (Table 1) . 601
Another difficulty in estimating the utilities associated with the attributes of hypothetical 602 policies and programs via stated choice programs is the proper analytical treatment of collected 603 data. Resource economists have gradually adapted more complex and sophisticated statistical 604 specifications, moving from the simple binary logit model to the multinomial logit model to the 605 conditional logit model and now the mixed effects logit model (Hensher and Greene 2002) . With 606 the addition of each additional specification comes a new set of assumptions that analysts must 607 be wary of. Here, we used a mixed logit model with one random parameter, the individual, that 608 we specified as being normally distributed. Our specification is not analytically novel, but it does 609 mitigate all of the concerns raised by Hensher and Greene (2002) . These concerns include: 610 appropriate selection of parameters to be included as random parameters, appropriate selection of 611 the distribution of the random parameters and appropriate specification of the way random 612 parameters enter the model. We felt the mixed logit specification was appropriate given it relaxes 613 independence of irrelevant alternatives property inherent in standard logit and conditional logit 614 models and subsequently allows response variable to be correlated across the choice situations 615 presented to each individual (Train 2009 ). Future work that chooses to used stated preference 616 data to estimate forest owners' intent to enroll in payments for carbon sequestration programs, 617 PAYMENTS FOR C SEQUESTRATION TO ALLEVIATE DEVELOPMENT PRESSURE 28 and chooses to fit those data with mixed effects logit specifications should be mindful of the 618 concerns detailed by Hensher and Greene (2002) 619
Conclusion 620
We began this investigation to determine forest owners' willingness to enroll in a 621 payments for carbon sequestration market in an urbanizing region. In our study area surrounding 622 metropolitan Charlotte, the potential for market failure is high as urbanization is rapidly 623 consuming the landscape (Meentemeyer et al. 2013; Terando et al. 2014) . Even if private forest 624 owners are committed to not developing their properties, they can benefit financially from stands 625 on their property by harvesting them for timber production. Both development and harvesting for 626 timber production are financially enticing, but dramatically alter the ecological function of the 627 landscape. While the majority of forest owners in our study were reluctant to indicate an intent to 628 enroll in payments for carbon sequestration programs, we did identify several groups of forest 629 owners likely to capitalize on the benefits provided by payments for ecosystem services 630 programs, namely the ability to receive annual revenue capable of offsetting rising property taxes 631 and the ability to maintain non-market values such as local aesthetics and recreation use values. 632
If a payments for carbon sequestration program could be combined with payments for other 633 ecosystem services such as water quality and wildlife habitat, it is possible these individuals 634 would be even more likely to see these 'alternative' forest management programs as viable 635 mechanisms from which they could benefit financially and maintain the strong personal 636 meanings they hold towards their forestlands. Programs could become even more attractive if 637 payments accounted for carbon already stored or the social cost of carbon. On a strategic level, 638 payments for carbon sequestration programs offer the promise of preserving local ecological 639 PAYMENTS FOR C SEQUESTRATION TO ALLEVIATE DEVELOPMENT PRESSURE 29 structure and function while simultaneously enabling forest owners to benefit financially from 640 the public goods they provide to society. 641 PAYMENTS FOR C SEQUESTRATION TO ALLEVIATE DEVELOPMENT PRESSURE 1 (Fletcher, Kittredge, and Stevens 2009; Dickinson et al. 2012; Markowski-Lindsay et al. 2011; Rabotyagov and Lin 2013; Knoot, Rickenbach, and Silbernagel 2015; Kelly, Germain, and Stehman 2015; Wade and Moseley 2011; Miller et al. 2014; Finley and Kittredge 2006) ; an early withdrawal penalty (Fletcher, Kittredge, and Stevens 2009; Dickinson et al. 2012; Markowski-Lindsay et al. 2011) ; payment mode (Kelly, Germain, and Stehman 2015) ; development and/or timber rights conveyed (Kelly, Germain, and Stehman 2015) ; inspections (Knoot, Rickenbach, and Silbernagel 2015) ; enrolled acreage (Markowski-Lindsay et al. 2011; Rabotyagov and Lin 2013) .
PAYMENTS FOR C SEQUESTRATION TO ALLEVIATE DEVELOPMENT PRESSURE 3 Notes. n = 60 (540 discrete choices); Wald  2 (16) = 68.24; p >  2 < 0.001; *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10 a 5-year contract is the base category b $5 per acre annual payment is the base category c Administration by a federal agency is the base category (Folmer, Gabel, and Opschoor 1995) . b Mean total timber value was $23,398 (SD = $27,076). Timber value estimates derived from on-site assessments of: number and type of tree species present; average tree age; maximum diameter at breast height; and total forested area. Values were calculated only for forest owners' properties where on-site assessments were conducted (n = 41). This value does not
